Consider two parties Alice and Bob, who hold private inputs x and y, and wish to compute a function f (x, y) privately in the information theoretic sense; that is, each party should learn nothing beyond f (x, y). However, the communication channel available to them is noisy. This means that the channel can introduce errors in the transmission between the two parties. Moreover, the channel is adversarial in the sense that it knows the protocol that Alice and Bob are running, and maliciously introduces errors to disrupt the communication, subject to some bound on the total number of errors. A fundamental question in this setting is to design a protocol that remains private in the presence of large number of errors.
INTRODUCTION
Consider two parties, A and B that wish to compute some function f (x, y) of their respective private inputs x, y. The channel connecting the parties might be prone to error, and in order to compute f the parties run some error-resilient interactive protocol that is guaranteed to output f (x, y) as long as the amount of error is small (e.g., the fraction of corrupt messages is below some threshold c > 0).
If efficiency is not concerned, party A can simply encode its input using a standard (Shannon) error-correcting code that corrects a fraction c < 1/2 of errors [Sha48] ; party B computes the output f (x, y) and sends it back (encoded with the same parameters) to A. This allows a global error rate of up to 1/4. However, x might be very large, and more efficient protocols (communication-wise) can be found. In 1993, Schulman [Sch93, Sch96] showed a way to compile any interactive protocol π that assumes no error, into an errorresilient protocol Π that withstands a fraction of errors of up to 1/240, whose overhead is linear (i.e., the communication of Π, is linear in the communication of π). This was followed by a flow of other works [RS94, BR11, GMS11, BK12, BN13, FGOS13] trying to improve the efficiency or error-resilience in various settings. Notably, the work of Braverman and Rao [BR11] showed how to compile a (noiseless) π into an error-resilient Π that correctly computes f as long as the error fraction is less than 1/4. Their construction, similar to the construction of Schulman, has a linear overhead (such constructions are also called constant rate). The recent elegant work of Brakerski and Kalai [BK12] shows how to achieve efficient computation in the presence of adversarial noise of rates less than 1/32 (for binary alphabet).
All the above works consider only the correctness of the protocol in the presence of adversarial error. In this work we aim at achieving other properties as well, specifically, privacy. We ask the following question:
Can error-resilient protocols tolerating some constant fraction of errors be devised, if we also require the protocol to be private, that is, not to leak any information besides f (x, y)?
Some functions cannot be privately computed even when the communication channel is noise-free, so the above question should only apply to functions that can be privately computed over a noiseless channel. The set of such functions was defined by Kushilevitz [Kus92] and independently by Beaver [Bea91] . Although this set is rather small, it still contains some very interesting functions such as the Vickrey function for 2 nd -price auctions [Vic61] (see more details below). Evidently, privacy is no longer guaranteed when compiling a private (error-free) protocol π for f using the methods of Schulman or Braverman and Rao. For instance, Schulman's scheme works by 'running' π until the users suspect their views are 'inconsistent' due to channel errors. Then, the users 'backtrack' to the last consistent point and continue from there. This "rewinding" is vital for the protocol's ability to recover from errors, yet it is fatal for its privacy.
We answer the above question in the negative, and show that privacy and error-resilience are in fact contradicting aspirations.
Theorem 1.1 (Separation Theorem). For any constant c > 0, there exists a function f such that a private protocol for f exists in the error-free setting, but no protocol is both private and correctly computes f over a noisy channel with at most a c-fraction of adversarial errors.
In fact, our impossibility result is even stronger, as it rules out protocols even when the error-rate is below constant: Theorem 1.2 (main, informal). There is a function f taking two inputs of size n, such that there is a private protocol for f in the error-free setting, but no private protocol correctly computes f over a noisy channel with O(2 −n )-fraction of adversarial errors.
With our result, it is very interesting to compare private computations in the error-free model, the random-noise model, and the adversarial-error model. As first shown by Kushilevitz [Kus89, Kus92] and Beaver [Bea91] , in the error-free model, some functions are privately-computable and others are not. The set of functions that can be privately computed is fully characterized in [Bea91, Kus92] , wherein an optimal protocol for any function in this set is also provided. In the random-noise model, it is possible to obtain oblivious transfer over several types of channels, e.g., the binary symmetric channel [CK88] and the unfair noisy channel [DFMS04] . Since any function f can be privately computed assuming oblivious transfer [Kil88] , any function can be privately computed assuming a (certain types of) random noise.
In the adversarial-error model, on the other hand, we show that depending on the error rate, there are functions that can be privately computed in the error-free setting but not in the adversarial-error model. Thus, there is no hope to achieve constant-rate schemes for any function f , or even for any f which can be computed privately in the error-free setting.
Techniques. Our key insight is that resilience to errors implies that the protocol must be able to "backtrack" its course from an incorrect track reached due to channel errors, while, at least intuitively, privacy should prevent the protocol from taking any course other than the correct one and prevent "rewinding" the protocol and changing its intermediates inputs. Hence, showing that privacy forces the protocol to advance in a specific order, say, through specific ordered steps, would imply that error-correction can be performed only within a single step, but not between steps.
The line of work initiated by Kushilevitz [Kus89, Kus92] and Beaver [Bea91] helps us with this problem. In particular, the result of Maji, Prabhakaran and Rosulek [MPR09] , shows that private protocols in the error-free model must advance in very specific ways. The progress of such a protocol can be split into steps where at each step only a single quantum of information is revealed (namely, a single decomposition of the domain, see formal definitions in Section 2). Moreover, revealing the information of step i before the information of step j < i is revealed leads to violating privacy. The amount of steps depends only on f , and for any d ≤ 2(2 n − 1) there exists a privately-computable function with exactly d steps [Kus92] .
We revisit the works of [Bea91, Kus92, MPR09] and examine them in the adversarial error model. We show that a similar property exists in any private, error-resilient protocol. Next, we show that if a channel completely changes the messages of two consecutive steps, the privacy is compromised. This gives an upper bound of O(1/d) on the proportion of allowed error, and proves our main theorem.
More specifically, We identify the point in the protocol where A reveals that his input is in some set P rather than in Q (where P ∪ Q is some subset of his domain). The adversarial channel changes the messages of this "step" to lead B to believe that A's input is actually in Q. Then, at the next "step" it's B's turn to reveal whether his input is in some partition V, W of (a subset of) his domain. The channel keeps changing A's messages until the end of this step. However, this violates the privacy of B since his partition is done assuming A's input is in Q. Conditioned on the fact it is in P , the next step of B should have been decomposing his sub-domain intoṼ ,W = V, W . Hence, some information was leaked, and the protocol is not private.
Independent Work. Concurrently and independently of our work, Chung, Pass and Telang [CPT13] also examine impossibility results for coding schemes for secure interactive communication. They prove that there is no compiler that takes a protocol and generates a noise-resilient protocol with good parameters (i.e., constant rate) such that the compiled version exactly imitates the information revelation of the original protocol. Their work extends also to the computational setting where they show an interesting tradeoff between the noise susceptibility and the rate of any possible scheme.
We note that their work considers a model where a party can be adversarial together with the (rate-limited) adversarial channel. In contrast, our impossibility result works in a model where parties are semi-honest, and only the channel can be adversarial (and rate-limited). Thus, the model of [CPT13] and ours are incomparable (but closely related).
Roadmap. We start with preliminaries and definitions in Section 2. Of special importance is Section 2.2, where we model the adversarial channel, and give definitions of privacy and correctness in the presence of such a channel. In Section 3 we study the structure of transcripts generated by a perfectly private and correct protocol in the presence of adversarial channel. The main result of this section is Theorem 3.7 which proves that a private protocol must advance in a very specific sequence of steps. This fact is used in Section 4 to construct a channel that introduces errors at well-chosen points in the protocol execution and violates privacy. Section 5 states our main theorem for the case of protocols which are not perfectly secure. Full details can be found in the long version of this manuscript [GSW13] .
INTERACTIVE COMPUTATION WITH
AND WITHOUT NOISE 2.1 Preliminaries: two-party computation in the noiseless model
We begin by recalling some definitions of two-party computation, assuming noiseless communication. Two parties, A and B hold inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y respectively. The parties wish to compute the value of f : X × Y → Z for some finite set Z. The computation is done via an interactive probabilistic protocol π = (πA, πB). The protocol works in rounds and defines for each party, at each round, the next message to be transmitted as a function of its input, randomness, and received messages.
1 The parties send massages m ∈ Σ according to π in an alternating 2 way: for odd rounds, mi = πA(x, RA, m2m4 · · · mi−1) and for even rounds mi = πB(y, RB, m1m3 · · · mi−1). We denote the transcript of a specific instance t = m1m2 · · · as the messages transmitted within that instance. We assume messages are delimited so it is possible to parse the transcript into specific messages.
At the end of an execution of π, the parties compute their outputs as a function of their respective inputs, randomness, and views. These functions will be denoted by out π A (·, ·, ·) and out π B (·, ·, ·) respectively. That is, for inputs (x, y) ∈ X × Y , transcript t, and randomness RA, RB, party A's output will be out π A (x, RA, t), and B's output is out π B (y, RB, t). We will usually omit the randomness, and implicitly treat π (along with the output function) as a single randomized protocol.
Correctness and Privacy. We recall the standard definitions for correctness and privacy, assuming the computation is over an error-free channel. 
Definition 2 (Privacy for Noiseless Protocols).
A protocol is private (with respect to party A) if, for any x, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that f (x, y) = f (x , y), the protocol generates the same distribution of transcripts for inputs (x, y) and (x , y). Formally, for any t ∈ Σ * , Pr[t | x, y] = Pr[t | x , y]. Similarly, privacy of party B is given if for any x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y such that f (x,
Kushilevtiz [Kus92] and Beaver [Bea91] gave a full characterization for functions that can be computed privately (in the noiseless model). We now recall this characterization.
We say that f is column-partitionable if there exists a non-trivial partition of Y into disjoint P, Q ⊂ Y such that for any x ∈ X and for any y ∈ P, y ∈ Q, it holds that f (x, y) = f (x, y ). We refer to such P, Q as valid columnpartitions. We let fX×P and fX×Q be f restricted to the domains X ×P and X ×Q. Similarly, f is row-partitionable if we can partition X into Q and P such that for any y ∈ Y and any x ∈ P , x ∈ Q, it holds that f (x, y) = f (x , y). Domains that were achieved by a sequence of valid partitionings are called restricted domains. We say that some subdomain X ×Y is a restricted domain of depth d if it takes d recursive decompositions to obtain X × Y . Furthermore, we can generalize the notion of f being row-partitionable, if X can be partitioned into m > 1 disjoint sets X1, X2, . . . , Xm and for any u ∈ Xi and any v ∈ Xj where j = i, it holds that for every y ∈ Y , f (u, y) = f (v, y). A partition of X into m * disjoint sets is called maximal if any other partition of X has m ≤ m * . We will mostly consider binary decomposable functions-functions which are maximally partitionable into at most m = 2 partitions.
We say that f is partitionable if: (1) f is constant; or, (2) f is either row-partitionable or column-partitionable, and each of the restricted functions is also partitionable.
The following lemma, which appears in [Bea91, Kus92] , identifies the set of privately-computable functions exactly as the set of partitionable functions.
Lemma 2.1 ( [Bea91, Kus92] ). A function f has a perfectly correct protocol π (in the noiseless model) which is private with respect to both parties if and only if f is partitionable.
The noisy model: two-party computation over a noisy channel
Let us now augment the above model into a noisy version. First, let us define the notion of a channel. We assume an arbitrary, causal channel (possibly with memory). The channel's instantiation at the -th round
) is a distribution on Σ characterized by the (input, output) channel messages up to that round. Hence, the probability that the channel takes m = m1 · · · mn and outputs m = m 1 · · · m n is given by
Again we assume that the parties alternately send messages. For a specific instance of the protocol, we denote the transcript t = (t s , t r ) = (m1m2 · · · , m 1 m 2 · · · ) as the messages observed for that instance (where t s denotes the messages the parties send, and t r the massages they receive). We denote by t A protocol π = (πA, πB) over a noisy channel Ch is defined in a similar way to the noiseless case: the protocol defines for each party, at each round the next message to send as a function of its inputs, randomness and all the messages received up to that round. Explicitly, A's messages on odd rounds are m2i−1 = πA(x, RA, m 2 m 4 · · · m 2i−2 ), and B's messages on even rounds are m2i = πB(y, RB, m 1 m 3 · · · m 2i−1 ), with m = Ch(m).
For some protocol π over a channel Ch and some input (x, y) we can ask what is the set of possible transcripts generated by π for that input, and what is the probability to observe each such transcript. Formally, let T s (x, y, t r ) be the random variable describing t s = m1m2 · · · defined by π on inputs (x, y) given that t r = m 1 m 2 · · · is received by the parties. Then, the probability that an instance of π sending messages over a channel Ch on inputs (x, y) produces t = (t s , t r ) is given by
The probability can be generalized to any prefix of t in the standard way, quantifying the probability that π over Ch produces that prefix on (x, y). The probabilities to have a specific sent-messages transcript t s , and a specific receivedmessages transcript t r are given by the marginal probabilities,
For a given input (x, y) ∈ X × Y the execution of π with inputs (x, y) over channel Ch induces a distribution over the set of all transcripts according to the above equations. Let u be a fixed partial transcript. For a given string u such that the concatenation of u with u is a complete transcript, we can compute the probability that the protocol π (with inputs (x, y) and channel Ch) will produce u when executed with the history u. We will use π Ch (x, y; u) to refer to this distribution over completions u . We will use τ Ch (x, y) := t ← π
Ch (x, y) to denote the set of all possible (complete) transcripts generated by π on inputs (x, y) assuming messages are being sent over the channel Ch. The output function for A is defined as above, out 
Definition 3 (Error Rate of a Channel). We say that a channel Ch has error rate µ ∈ [0, 1], if for any inputs (x, y) and any transcript t ∈ τ Ch (x, y), it holds that η(t) ≤ µ|t|.
Correctness and Privacy. We now augment the privacy and correctness definitions to the noisy case. The correctness definition is straightforward.
Definition 4 (Perfect Correctness).
A protocol π is perfectly correct with respect to some function f over Ch if for any inputs x, y,
We further say a protocol π is perfectly correct with rate µ if π is perfectly correct over every channel Ch with error rate µ.
We define privacy in a similar way to the noiseless case, where the transcript doesn't leak more than what is trivially conveyed by the function's output.
Definition 5 (Perfect Privacy). A protocol π for f is perfectly private over Ch with respect to A if for any inputs such that f (x, y) = f (x , y), it holds that for any t
Similarly, perfect privacy with respect to B requires that whenever f (x, y) = f (x, y ) it also holds that Pr[t | x, y, Ch] = Pr[t | x, y , Ch]. Furthermore, We say that a protocol π is perfectly private with rate µ if it is perfectly private (for both players) over every channel Ch with rate µ.
We mention the following difference between our setting and the one used in [Bea91, Kus92, MPR09] . One of the assumptions used by these works is that the last message of π is the output f (x, y) (this doesn't restrict the generality of those results). However in our noisy model, this assumption doesn't make much sense as the channel can always "violate" the correctness of the protocol by changing this single message. To avoid this inconvenience we assume the output is given by the functions outA, outB and is not part of the transcript. The next lemma shows that this change has no effect on the distribution of transcripts, namely, that different outputs imply different transcripts, regardless of the parties' randomness (which is trivially the case when the output is part of the transcript).
Lemma 2.2. Let π be a perfectly correct and perfectly private protocol for a function f , and let x, y, y be inputs such that f (x, y) = f (x, y ). Then, for any channel Ch and for any transcript t,
Proof. We say that A's random tape RA is consistent with transcript t and input x if for 1 ≤ i ≤ |t|,
Let t * be a transcript such that both Pr[t * | x, y, Ch] > 0 and Pr[t * | x, y , Ch] > 0. Consider the set, St * = { RA | RA is consistent with t * and x } As Pr[t * | x, y, Ch] > 0, by perfect correctness, for all RA ∈ St * , we have outA(x, RA, t * ) = f (x, y). Similarly, as Pr[t * | x, y , Ch] > 0, for all RA ∈ St * , we have that outA(x, RA, t * ) = f (x, y ). But these statements are mutually contradictory as f (x, y) = f (x, y ). Therefore, it must be that either Pr[t
PRIVATE PROTOCOLS: THE PERFECT CASE
The goal of this section is to show that a private protocol reveals information about the parties' inputs in a particular well-defined order. This section extends the results in [MPR09] to the noisy channel setting. In particular, we analyze the transcripts of the protocol and show that they proceed through well-defined stages that depend upon the partitioning of the function. At each such stage, one of the parties necessarily reveals a particular partition of its input space in which its current input lies. This is formalized by the concept of "frontiers"(see Definition 7 for the formal definition). A frontier is a prefix-free set of partial transcripts which is maximal in the sense that every transcript has a prefix in the frontier. The main result of this section is Theorem 3.7, where we construct a set of frontiers which correspond to the stages where the transcripts reveal the partitions.
We focus on functions that have a certain structure, which we call binary-uniquely decomposable: their domain is maximally row-partitionable into 2 partitions and is not columnpartitionable. Each one of the two restricted domains is either constant or (maximally, binary) column-partitionable but not row-partitionable. This continues recursively in an alternating manner (i.e., one level row-partitionable and the next level is column-partitionable). Although the proofs could be extended to a more general case, this simpler class of functions is enough for our impossibility result, as we are only required to provide one function that has no perfectlycorrect and private protocol over a noisy channel (of certain parameters). A simple example of such a function is the following Vickrey auction function [Vic61] f
nd -price (Vickrey) auctions, as it practically outputs (to both parties and the auctioneer) the value of min(x, y) as well as the identity of the party that holds the minimal value, encoded via the parity of the output. Our first step is to identify certain inputs that form a minor. These will be associated with each level of f 's decomposition.
Definition 6 (Minor). We say that x, x , y, y form a j-minor (resp., a i-minor) if
).
Lemma 3.1. Assume a binary-uniquely decomposable function f on X × Y which is row-partitionable into P, Q, but not column-partitionable. Then, exactly one of the following happens.
1. Both fQ×Y and fP ×Y are constant.
2. Only one of fQ×Y , fP ×Y is constant, and there exists a j-minor (x, x , y, y ) with x and x in different sets of the partition (specifically x is in the constant partition). Furthermore, y, y are in different sets of the columnpartitioning of the non-constant restricted function.
3. Both fQ×Y and fP ×Y are non constants, and there are at least two "overlapping" minors: if fQ×Y is partitioned into YQ 0 , YQ 1 and fP ×Y is partitioned into YP 0 , YP 1 , there exist minors (x, x , y, y ) and (x, x , w, w ) where x ∈ P and x ∈ Q. And if both y, y are in the same partition YP i and both w, w are in YQ j then YP i ∩ YQ j contains one of w, w and one of y, y .
Proof. We note that cases 1 and 2 are simple, and prove case 3. First, we mention that YP 0 , YP 1 is not a valid partition for fQ×Y , since if it was, then f would be columnpartitionable in contradiction to its definition. The same applies to YQ 0 , YQ 1 and fP ×Y . Consider fP ×Y . There must exist x ∈ P and y ∈ YQ 0 , y ∈ YQ 1 such that f (x, y) = f (x, y ), or otherwise YQ 0 , YQ 1 is a valid column partition of fP ×Y . It follows that y, y must be in the same partition YP i . Note that for any x ∈ Q, (x, x , y, y ) is a minor.
Let YQ j be the partition that has non-empty intersection with both YP 0 , YP 1 (at least one of YQ 0 , YQ 1 must intersect both YP 0 , YP 1 , or otherwise f is column-partitionable). There must exist u ∈ Q and w ∈ YQ j ∩ YP 0 , w ∈ YQ j ∩ YP 1 such that f (u , w) = f (u , w ), or otherwise YP 0 , YP 1 is a valid partition for fQ×Y . Then, for any u ∈ P (and specifically for x), (u , u, w, w ) is a j-minor. Finally, note that we are allowed to choose any x ∈ Q, u ∈ P ; we choose x = u and u = x and complete the proof.
With this setting we can start exploring the sequential revelation of information in private protocols. Consider inputs (x, x , y, y ) which form a j-minor. The following lemma shows that transcripts produced by inputs (x, y) and those produced by inputs (x , y) must differ at some point. Further, the earliest point where they differ must be a point where party A speaks.
Lemma 3.2. For a perfectly correct π for f over Ch, the following holds. If f (x, y) = f (x , y), then for any t ∈ τ Ch (x, y) ∪ τ Ch (x , y) there exists an odd round ρ such that × Pr π(x, y, t
which leads to a contradiction. The third transition is due the fact that for any round k < ρ,
, by the way we define ρ.
The next two lemmas show that when considering two consecutive levels of the decomposition (say, row-decomposition followed by a column-decomposition; those are associated with some j-minor (x, x , y, y )), if party B reveals some information about whether his input is y or y (i.e. the column-decomposition), it must be the case, that party A has completely revealed whether his input is x or x , or more precisely, whether his input is in P or Q for the matching row-partition.
Lemma 3.3. For a perfectly correct π for f over Ch, the following holds. For any x, x , y, y that form a j-minor, let t ∈ τ
Ch (x , y) ∪ τ Ch (x , y ), and let ρ be the first round where
Proof. First, note that ρ must be even (this follows from Lemma 3.2). Assume towards contradiction that Pr[t[1.
In addition, due to B's privacy and the fact that f (x, y) = f (x, y ), for any round ρ and specifically for the above ρ Lemma 3.4. Let π be a perfectly-correct private protocol for f over Ch. For any x, x , y, y that form a j-minor, let t ∈ τ
Ch (x, y) ∪ τ Ch (x, y ). Then, there exists a round ρ such that
.ρ ] for some ρ , it holds that ρ < ρ.
Proof. We conclude with the following Theorem, which is an immediate corollary of the above lemmas, and formalizes the fact that there is a round in which we fully know the row-partition but nothing about the next-level column-decomposition.
Theorem 3.5. Let π be perfectly-correct private protocol for f over Ch. Let x, x , y, y form a j-minor. Then, for any transcript t, there is a round ρ such that at least one of the following is satisfied. It is important to note at this point that analogous claims for the above Lemma 3.1 through Theorem 3.5 can similarly be shown for a binary-uniquely decomposable f which is column-partitionable but not row-partitionable, and for (x, x , y, y ) being a i-minor instead of a j-minor, etc.
Frontiers: dealing with more than a single transcript
While above we have analyzed one transcript at a time, we now extend the definitions to treat many transcripts (e.g., the entire τ Ch (x, y)) at the same time. In the spirit of [MPR09] we define frontiers as a means to deal with several transcripts rather than a single transcript. We begin with a few definitions.
Definition 7 (Frontiers).
A set F of partial transcripts is called a frontier if, 1. F is prefix-free 3 .
2. F is maximal, i.e., Pr[F | x, y, Ch] = 1 for all inputs x, y, where
Informally, we say that a partial transcript u has reached frontier F if u ∈ F . For frontiers F and G, we will also be interested in the probability that F 'precedes' G; that is, the probability that the protocol reaches frontier F before it reaches frontier G. the weighted probability of all the transcripts in F that are prefixes of transcripts in G. In the same manner define Pr[F < G | x, y, Ch] for transcripts which are strict prefixes.
For notational conciseness, for fixed x, y, Ch, we will use the statement "F ≤ G" as a shorthand for the statement "Pr[F ≤ G | x, y, Ch] = 1". The same holds for the statement "F < G".
Given a minor (x, x , y, y ) we define the set F (x, x , y, y ) as the collection of transcripts prefixes up to the point where the partitioning related with this minor "happens". Note that the length of each prefix can be different.
Definition 9. For a minor (x, x , y, y ) define
t is a transcript and ρ = ρ(t) is the minimal round satisfying Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 3.6. Given a minor (x, x , y, y ), the set F (x, x , y, y ) is a frontier.
Proof. First, we show that F = F (x, x , y, y ) is prefix free. Assume that u, v ∈ F such that u is a strict prefix of v. Let t be any transcript with prefix v. The minimal ρ that satisfies Theorem 3.5 for t is |u|, therefore it cannot be that v ∈ F because of t. However, this claim holds for any t whose prefix is v, thus v / ∈ F . Second, observe that F is maximal since we consider all possible transcripts t.
We are now ready for the main theorem of this section. Let f be a binary-uniquely decomposable function on X × Y and let π be a perfectly correct and private protocol for f . We define a sequence of domains
For any such sequence we define a sequence of frontiers Fi = F (Xi × Yi) where Fi represents one decomposition step of the protocol (i.e., the decomposition of Xi × Yi into Xi−1 × Yi−1 and (Xi \ Xi−1) × Yi−1, assuming that the ith decomposition level is a row-partition). Furthermore, it holds that Fi+1 ≤ Fi, that is, the protocol reaches these frontiers exactly in their order (i.e., the information about f 's decomposition is revealed exactly in this order).
Theorem 3.7. Suppose that f is binary-uniquely decomposable and assume that the maximal number of decomposition in f is d ≥ 1. Let π be a perfectly-correct private protocol for f over Ch.
and Xi × Yi is one of the partitions of Xi+1 × Yi+1. Then, for any Xi × Yi there exists a frontier Fi = F (Xi × Yi) such that (assuming fX i ×Y i is row-partitionable; a similar claim holds if fX i ×Y i is column-partitionable.), for any x, x ∈ Xi and y, y ∈ Yi, and any u ∈ Fi, 
if x, x belong to different partitions, at least one of
Moreover, for any restricted domain Xj × Yj such that Xi × Yi ⊂ Xj × Yj, it holds that Fj ≤ Fi.
Proof. Assume fX i ×Y i is row-partitionable into P, Q ⊂ X. We prove the claim by induction on i = 1 . . . d. We split the proof into cases according to Lemma 3.1.
Case I: fP ×Y i , fQ×Y i are constant. Let Fi be the set of complete transcripts Fi = {t ∈ τ Ch (x, y) | x, y ∈ Xi × Yi}, and the claim follows from privacy, and Lemma 2.2. Also note that this must be the case for the induction's base case X1 × Y1.
Case II: fP ×Y i is constant but fQ×Y i is not.
By Lemma 3.1 we know that there exists a minor (x•, x • , y•, y • ) where x• ∈ P and x • ∈ Q. Define Fi = F (x•, x • , y•, y • ) as given by Definition 9. We begin with proving the first property.
If x, x ∈ P the first property trivially holds from the privacy of (the constant) fP ×Y i .
as given by Theorem 3.5, and the way we have defined Fi.
We now prove the second property. Let x ∈ P, x ∈ Q and y, y ∈ Yi. Note that due to Theorem 3.5, for any u ∈ Fi it holds that at least one of
, the former due to privacy (recall that fP ×Y i is constant) and the latter due to the induction hypothesis on Q × Yi. This completes the proof of property (2.) for this case. Figure 1) . By using the same reasoning as in Case II, the first term also equals Pr[u | x, w, Ch] and the second also equals Pr[u | x , y , Ch] which implies these frontiers are in fact the same.
It is easy to verify that the induction holds for this case as well: the first property holds due to the same reason as the case where x, x ∈ Q in Case II; when x, x ∈ P we use the minor (x•, x • , w•, w • ) and when x, x ∈ Q we use the minor (x•, x • , y•, y • ).
The second property follows the same way as in Case II.
Finally, we complete the induction by showing that Fi ≤ Fi−1 (assuming the induction holds for all Fj with j < i). Suppose not, and let u ∈ Fi be a transcript that violates this condition, that is, there exists u ∈ Fi−1 such that u is a strict prefix of u. Due to the way we construct the frontiers, either Fi contains only complete transcripts (and then any frontier Fj satisfies Fj ≤ Fi) or otherwise Fi−1 is defined via Definition 9 by some minor x, x , y, y where x, x ∈ Xi−1 and y, y ∈ Yi−1 (wlog, a i-minor); additionally, let v, v , w, w be the (j-)minor that defines Fi, where v, v ∈ Xi and w, w ∈ Yi.
By Theorem 3.5 we know that for any u ∈ Fi−1, either Pr[u | x, y, Ch] = 0 or Pr[u | x, y , Ch] = 0. If both are 0 then u (or prefix or it) is in Fi by its construction and it can't be that u ∈ Fi for any u that has a proper prefix u .
Otherwise, since u is a prefix of u, it follows that also either Pr[u | x, y, Ch] = 0 or Pr[u | x , y, Ch] = 0. However, Xi−1 and Xi \ Xi−1 form a valid partitioning of Xi, thus x, x are both in the same partition after the decomposition
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PRIVATE, NOISE-RESILIENT PROTOCOLS
Intuitively, Theorem 3.7 implies that information is leaked by order: first A speaks and tells where, in the first decomposition his input lies (and until then, B doesn't say anything meaningful); then it's B's turn to reveal where his input lies in the next decomposition, etc. It is not allowed to give information beyond the current point of decomposition (this will damage privacy), and moreover, if the other side does not acknowledge the correct partition of the decomposition, he might violate his privacy (or at least the protocol outputs a wrong output). This gives a strict bound on the error rate any such protocol can withstand.
Before we prove our impossibility result, we discuss a subtlety regarding the definition of error rate in protocols of varying length. Consider a (deterministic) protocol so that for any input x, y we can match a single transcript t (x,y) . Assume that for any (x, y) = (x , y ) it holds that |t (x,y) | = |t (x ,y ) |. In this setting, Definition 3 has no practical meaning. Indeed, if the channel is allowed to corrupt a fraction c ∈ (0, 1) of the transmission, and the protocol runs on the input whose transcript t is the longest, the protocol might terminate before round |t|, and the 'effective' fraction of errors in the observed transcript will be higher than c.
To overcome this issue, we restrict our discussion only to protocols whose output length is the same for every transcript. This doesn't restrict the power of the protocol: after executing outA, outB the parties can send "0" as many times as needed, ignoring any received messages. On the other hand, the channel is potentially stronger, as it is allowed a higher proportion of errors for transcripts that prematurely terminate (if any exists). We also mention that protocols in which both parties always have consensus about whose turn it is to speak and whether or not the protocol has ended, must be of the same length for any input; see Claim 9 in [BR11] .
Theorem 4.1 (main). Let f be a binary-uniquely decomposable function with maximal decomposition depth d. Then, no private protocol for f is perfectly correct and perfectly private with error rate 1/d. Namely, for every perfectly correct protocol π for f , there exists a channel Ch * with error rate 1/d, such that π Ch * is not private.
We begin with an intuitive outline of the proof. For any protocol π, we will construct a channel Ch * which violates party B's privacy. In particular, we will show there exist inputs x ∈ X, y, y ∈ Y , and a transcript t, such that
We start with inputs x0, x1 ∈ X, y0, y1 ∈ Y which form a jminor, and analyze protocol π with the noiseless channel Ch 0 . Theorem 3.7 tells us precisely how information about the inputs (x0, x1, y0, y1) is revealed by π: first A reveals whether its input is in the partition corresponding to x0 or x1, then, if A's input is in the partition corresponding to x1, B reveals whether its input is in the partition corresponding to y0 or y1. More precisely, there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ d, such that, − till frontier Fi, party A does not reveal any information that can distinguish the partitions corresponding to x0 from x1, − at frontier Fi+1, party A reveals whether its input is in the partition corresponding to x0 or x1,
− if A's input was in partition corresponding to x1, B reveals the partition of its own input at frontier Fi+2.
We use the above observations to design the adversarial channel Ch * . Consider an execution of π with inputs x0, y0. The channel lets the messages go back and forth unmodified till the protocol reaches frontier Fi. At this stage, it samples a random tape RA for A consistent with the transcript so far, and input x1. Thereafter, the channel replaces A's messages with what it would have sent had its input been x1 and random tape RA. Note that as transcripts for x0 and x1 are identically distributed till frontier Fi, B's view is consistent with the execution of π with inputs x1, y0 with the noiseless channel. The channel Ch * continues modifying A's messages this way until in B's view, the protocol reaches frontier Fi+2. At this point party B has revealed information about the partition of its input, which violates its privacy.
The crucial missing piece in the above is the rate of the channel Ch * . Recall that our channel is allowed to introduce only a 1/d fraction of errors. If we pick an arbitrary minor (x0, x1, y0, y1) and launch the above attack, it is possible that the frontiers Fi+2 and Fi are "far apart", and thus the channel has to introduce large number of errors. To avoid this, we start by picking inputs x1, y0 from a restricted subdomain of depth d, and a transcript t in τ Ch (x1, y0). As there are d frontiers, by an averaging argument, there exists an i such that the fraction of messages in t between Fi and Fi+2 is 2/d. Further, there must exist x0, y1 such that (x0, x1, y0, y1) forms a j-minor which corresponds to the frontier Fi. The channel Ch * uses this minor for the attack described above. The formal proof follows. Let F1, . . . , F d be the frontiers given by Theorem 3.7, and let F0 be the empty set. We re-index the frontiers in a reverse order so that
be the length of the longest prefix of t in Fj. Then for 0 ≤ j < k ≤ d, we can define the number of messages in t between Fj and F k , λ j,k (t), as
For any partial transcript u, we define the active domain at u as the set of inputs that have a non-zero probability of producing a transcript with prefix u. Let Xi × Yi be the active domain at the longest prefix of t in Fi (clearly (x, y) ∈ Xi × Yi)). Let the next decomposition step be a row-decomposition, with row partitions X x1, y0, y1 ) form a j-minor. As f (x, y0) = f (x, y1), inputs (x0, x, y0, y1) also form a j-minor. Now we will construct a channel Ch * that violates B's privacy. Let u be the longest prefix of t in Fi. Fix, t ∈ τ Ch 0 (x0, y0) that also has u as a prefix. The existence of t is guaranteed by Theorem 3.7. Define the channel Ch * as follows:
− Ch * does not introduce any errors till |u| rounds. If the partial transcript so far is not identical to u, the channel acts as the noiseless channel Ch 0 for the entire protocol.
− If the partial transcript up to round |u| is identical to u, then the channel modifies messages as follows: sample a random tape RA for party A from the conditional distribution over random tapes given the transcript so far and the input x ∈ X 1 i . For the next λ = λi,i+2 rounds, send B's messages to A without change. Change A's sent messages to what A would have sent when using input x and the random tape sampled earlier. That is, for every message m, every odd round j such that |u| < j ≤ |u| + λ,
The channel continues with the remaining protocol without modifying any messages.
First, note that Ch * introduces only 1/d fraction of errors. This is because it only changes half of the messages between frontiers Fi and Fi+2, of which there are only a fraction 2/d of the length of transcript t. As all transcripts are of the same length, the channel makes only 1/d fraction errors.
Next To maintain readability of the probability calculations below, we take two notational short-cuts: (1) all probabilities below are conditioned on observing the prefix u, but we do not explicitly mention this conditioning, and (2) we analyze t * only up to round |u| + λ, so from now on we will take t * to mean the prefix t and although f (x0, y0) = f (x0, y1) we learn that B holds y0 rather than y1, in violation of B's privacy according to Definition 4.
PRIVATE PROTOCOLS: THE NON-PERFECT CASE
The above results assume the protocol to be perfectlycorrect, which is interesting on its own. Indeed, possibility results for computing non-private functions over adversarial channels [Sch96, BR11] do achieve perfect correctness for error rate less than 1/4. However, from a practical point of view, the question of computing private functions over a noisy channel is interesting also for the non-perfect case, that is, where the protocol is only (1 − ε)-correct and (1 − δ)-private, for some ε, δ > 0. Definition 11 (Privacy). We say that a protocol π is (1 − δ)-private with respect to party A over a channel Ch, if for any x, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y such that f (x, y) = f (x , y), and for any frontier F , it holds that SD Ch F ((x, y), (x , y)) ≤ δ, where Finally, we say that π is an (ε, δ)-protocol for f if π is (1 − ε)-correct and (1 − δ)-private.
Our main result for (ε, δ)-protocols is the following.
Theorem 5.1 (main, (ε, δ)-case). Let f be a function that is binary-uniquely decomposable and has maximal decomposition depth d. Then, for every protocol π and for any small enough ε, δ > 0, there exists a channel Ch * with error rate 1/d, such that π Ch * is not (ε, δ)-protocol for f . 
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